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Over the last twenty years economists’ prescriptions for reform of the interna-
tional monetary system have taken various shapes. Their common premise was
dissatisfaction with the Bretton Woods regime as it evolved in the 1950s. Robert
Triffin awakened the world to the contradictions and instabilities of a system of
pegged parities that relied on the debts in reserve currencies, mostly dollars, to meet
growing needs for official reserves. Triffin and his followers saw the remedy as the
internationalization of reserves and reserve assets; their ultimate solution was a
world central bank. Others diagnosed the problem less in terms of liquidity than in
the inadequacies of balance of payments adjustment mechanisms in the modern world.
The inadequacies were especially evident under the fixed-parity gold-exchange stan-
dard when, as in the 1960s, the reserve currency center was structurally in chronic
deficit. These analysts sought better and more symmetrical “rules of the game” for
adjustments by surplus and deficit countries, usually including more flexibility in
the setting of exchange parities, crawling pegs, and the like. Many economists, of
whom Milton Friedman was an eloquent and persuasive spokesman, had all along
advocated floating exchange rates, determined in private markets without official
interventions.
By the early l970s the third view was the dominant one in the economics profes-
sion, though not among central bankers and private financiers. And all of a sudden,
thanks to Nixon and Connally, we got our wish. Or at least we got as much of it as
anyone could reasonably have hoped, since it could never have been expected that
governments would eschew all intervention in exchange markets.
Now after five to seven years-depending how one counts-of unclean floating there
are many second thoughts. Some economists share the nostalgia of men of affairs for
the gold standard or its equivalent, for a fixed anchor for the world’s money, for
stability of official parities. Some economists, those who emphasize the rationality of
expectations and the flexibility of prices in all markets, doubt that it makes much
difference whether exchange rates are fixed or flexible, provided only that govern-
ment policies are predictable. Clearly, flexible rates have not been the panacea which
their more extravagant advocates had hoped; international monetary problems have
not disappeared from headlines or from the agenda of anxieties of central banks and
governments.
I believe that the basic problem today is not the exchange rate regime, whether
fixed or floating. Debate on the regime evades and obscures the essential problem.
That is the excessive international-or better, inter-currency-mobility of private fi-
nancial capital. The biggest thing that happened in the world monetary system since
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the l950s was the establishment of de facto complete convertibility among major
currencies, and the development of intermediaries and markets, notably Eurocurrency
institutions, to facilitate conversions. Under either exchange rate regime the cur-
rency exchanges transmit disturbances originating in international financial mar-
kets. National economies and national governments are not capable of adjusting to
massive movements of funds across the foreign exchanges, without real hardship
and without significant sacrifice of the objectives of national economic policy with
respect to employment, output, and inflation. Specifically, the mobility of financial
capital limits viable differences among national interest rates and thus severely re-
stricts the ability of central banks and governments to pursue monetary and fiscal
policies appropriate to their internal economies. Likewise speculation on exchange
rates, whether its consequences are vast shifts of official assets and debts or large
movements of exchange rates themselves, have serious and frequently painful real
internal economic consequences. Domestic policies are relatively powerless to escape
them or offset them.
The basic problems are these. Goods and labor move, in response to interna-
tional price signals, much more sluggishly than fluid funds. Prices in goods and
labor markets move much more sluggishly, in response to excess supply or demand,
than the prices of financial assets, including exchange rates. These facts of life are
essentially the same whether exchange rates are floating or fixed. The difficulties
they create for national economies and policy-makers cannot be avoided by opting
for one exchange rate regime or the other, or by providing more or different interna-
tional liquidity, or by adopting new rules of the game of balance of payments adjust-
ment. I do not say that those issues are unimportant or that reforms of those aspects
of the international monetary system may not be useful. For example, I still think
that floating rates are an improvement on the Bretton Woods system. I do not con-
tend that the major problems we are now experiencing will continue unless some-
thing else is done too.
There are two ways to go. One is toward a common currency, common monetary
and fiscal policy, and economic integration. The other is toward greater financial
segmentation between nations or currency areas, permitting their central banks
and governments greater autonomy in policies tailored to their specific economic
institutions and objectives. The first direction, however appealing, is clearly not a
viable option in the foreseeable future, i.e., the twentieth century. I therefore regret-
fully recommend the second, and my proposal is to throw some sand in the wheels of
our excessively efficient international money markets.
But first let us pay our respects to the “one world” ideal. Within the United
States, of course, capital is extremely mobile between regions, and has been for a
long time. Its mobility has served, continues to serve, important economic functions:
mobilizing funds from high-saving areas to finance investments that develop areas
with high marginal productivities of capital; financing trade deficits which arise
from regional shifts in population and comparative advantage or from transient eco-
nomic or natural shocks. With nationwide product and labor markets, goods and
labor also flow readily to areas of high demand, and this mobility is the essential
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cur. There is neither need for, nor possibility of, regional macroeconomic policies. It
would not be possible to improve employment in West Virginia or reduce inflation in
California. even temporarily, by changing the parity of a local dollar with dollars of
other Federal Reserve Districts. With a common currency, national financial and
capital markets, and a single national monetary policy, movements of funds to ex-
ploit interest arbitrage or to speculate on exchange rate fluctuations cannot be sources
of disturbances and painful interregional adjustments.
To recite this familiar account is to remind us how difficult it would be to repli-
cate its prerequisites on a worldwide basis.  Even for the Common Market countries,
the goal is still far, far distant.  We do not have to resolve the chicken-egg argu-
ment.  Perhaps it is true that establishing a common currency and a central macro-
economic policy will automatically generate the institutions, markets, and mobilities
which make the system viable and its regional economic consequences everywhere
tolerable.  The risk is one that few are prepared to take.  Moreover, EEC experience
to date suggests that it is very hard to contrive a scenario of gradual evolution to-
wards such a radically different regime, even though it could well be the global
optimum.
At present the world enjoys many benefits of the increased worldwide economic
integration of the last thirty years.  But the integration is partial and unbalanced; in
particular private financial markets have become internationalized much more rap-
idly and completely than other economic and political institutions.  That is why we
are in trouble.  So I turn to the second, and second best, way out, forcing some seg-
mentation of inter-currency financial markets.
My specific proposal is actually not new.  I offered it in 1972 in my Janeway
Lectures at Princeton, published in 1974 as The New Economics One Decade Older,
pp. 88-92.  The idea fell like a stone in a deep well.  If I cast it in the water again, it
is because events since the first try have strengthened my belief that something of
the sort needs to be done.
The proposal is an internationally uniform tax on all spot conversions of one
currency into another, proportional to the size of the transaction.  The tax would
particularly deter short-term financial round-trip excursions into another currency. 
A 1% tax, for example, could be overcome only by an 8 point differential in the an-
nual yields of Treasury bills or Eurocurrency deposits denominated in dollars and
Deutschmarks.  The corresponding differential for one-year maturities would be 2
points.  A permanent investment in another country or currency area, with regular
repatriation of yield when earned, would need a 2% advantage in marginal efficiency
over domestic investment.  The impact of the tax would be less for permanent cur-
rency shifts, or for longer maturities.  Because of exchange risks, capital value risks,
and market imperfections, interest arbitrage and exchange speculation are less
troublesome in long maturities.  Moreover, it is desirable to obstruct as little as pos-
sible international movements of capital responsive to long-run portfolio preferences
and profit opportunities.
Why do floating exchange rates not solve the problem?  There are several rea-
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First, as economists have long known, in a world of international capital mobil-
ity flexibility of exchange rates does not assure autonomy of national macroeconomic
policy.  The Mundell-Fleming models of the early 1960s showed how capital mobility
inhibits domestic monetary policy under fixed parities and domestic fiscal policy
under flexible rates.  Moreover, the availability of the remaining instrument of mac-
roeconomic policy in either regime is small consolation.  Nations frequently face com-
pelling domestic institutional, political, and economic constraints on one or the other
instrument, or on the policy mix.
Second, it may seem that we should welcome an exchange rate regime that in-
creases the potency of monetary policy relative to fiscal policy; after all, monetary
policy is the more flexible and responsive instrument of domestic stabilization.  But
the liberation of domestic monetary policy under flexible rates is in large degree
illusory. One reason is the attachment of central bankers to monetarist targets irre-
spective of exchange rate regimes and the openness of financial markets. More fun-
damentally, monetary policy becomes, under floating rates, exchange rate policy.
The stimulus of expansionary monetary policy to domestic demand is limited by the
competition of foreign interest rates for mobile funds. Thus much—in the limit, all—
of the stimulus depends on exchange depreciation and its effects on the trade bal-
ance, namely on shifting foreign and domestic demand to home goods and services.
The depreciation may occur all right, but its effects on the trade balance can be
perverse for a disconcertingly long short run, during which further depreciation,
perhaps reinforced by speculation, occurs. Meanwhile the effects of depreciation on
domestic currency prices of internationally traded goods are inflationary, even for
an economy with idle resources and no domestic sources of inflationary pressure.
Furthermore, there are international difficulties in reliance on monetary policy
in a floating rate regime. I quote from my 1972 lecture: “...When the export-import
balance becomes the strategic component of aggregate demand, one country’s expan-
sionary stimulus is another country’s deflationary shock. We can hardly imagine
that the Common Market will passively allow the U.S. to manipulate the dollar ex-
change rate in the interests of U.S. domestic stabilization. Nor can we imagine the
reverse. International coordination of interest rate policies will be essential in a re-
gime of floating exchange rates, no less than in a fixed parity regime.” The bickering
between Washington and Bonn about these issues in the last year is just what I had
in mind.
Third, governments are not and cannot be indifferent to changes in the values of
their currencies in exchange markets, any more than they did or could ignore changes
in their international reserves under the fixed-parity regime. The reasons for their
concern are not all macroeconomic; they include all the impacts on domestic indus-
tries, export and import-competing sectors, that arise from exchange rate fluctua-
tions originating in financial and capital transactions. The uncoordinated interven-
tions that make floating dirty are the governments’ natural mechanisms of defense
against shocks transmitted to their economies by foreign exchange markets.
Fourth, another optimistic hope belied by events was the belief that floating
rates would insulate economies from shocks to export and import demand. The same
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non-monetary demand shocks under floating rates also implied that trade balance
shocks would be absorbed completely in exchange rates without adjustment of do-
mestic output or prices. This will, of course, not be the case if the trade balance
moves the wrong way (anti-Marshall-Lerner), or if, for any of the other understand-
able reasons enumerated above, governments intervene to prevent full exchange
rate adjustment. It will not be the case anyway if exchange rate movements have
consequences for asset demands and supplies, as they will, either via the capital
gains or losses they produce for agents with long or short positions in foreign cur-
rency or via the expectations of future exchange rate movements which they gener-
ate.
The recent decline of the dollar against the Deutschmark, yen, and Swiss franc
illustrates many of the above points. The U.S., on the one hand, and Germany and
Japan on the other, clearly have divergent domestic histories, prospects, and objec-
tives in terms of output growth and inflation. The changes in currency exchange
rates have not served, as some proponents of flexible rates might have hoped, to
permit these countries to pursue their differing policies without mutual interfer-
ence. The Germans and Japanese have been reluctant to accept the effects of cur-
rency appreciation on their export industries, and so they have intervened to limit
the appreciation. The Americans, concerned about the effects of depreciation on price
indexes, have tightened monetary policy and raised interest rates in an attempt to
stem the anti-dollar tide in the foreign exchange markets.
This history also supports the assertion I made above, that goods “arbitrage” is
very slow relative to inter-currency financial speculation and portfolio shift. The net
result of exchange rate movements and domestic price movements over the past few
years has been to improve dramatically the competitive position of the U.S. vis-a-vis
Germany and Japan. This is true when wholesale prices indices, converted to a single
currency at prevailing exchange rates, are compared. Our trade-weighted real ex-
change rate is about 5% below 1977 and March 1973, and more than 7% below 1976.
Germany’s is 7% above 1973, though still below 1976 and 1977. Japan’s is 3% above
1973, 7% above 1976, and 2% above 1977. The change is even more spectacular when
labor costs are similarly compared. In 1970 U.S. hourly labor costs, including fringe
benefits, were the highest in the world, 67% above Germany, 300% above Japan. In
1977 five countries had higher costs at exchange rates prevailing in December. Our
costs were 16% below Germany, and now only 55% above Japan. (For these calcula-
tions, made at the Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft, Koln, I am indebted to Profes-
sor Herbert Giersch.)  The U.S. is now a low-wage country! Yet we are suffering from
the worst trade deficits in history.
I do not wish to be misunderstood. I think the hysteria over the recent decline of
the dollar is greatly overdone, and that the panicky pressure on our government to
defend the dollar-pressure from European governments, from financial circles here
and abroad, from the media—has been most unjustified. Moreover, anyone who thinks
that the pre-1971 system of pegged rates would have handled better the recent flight
from the dollar into marks, yen, and Swiss francs has a very short memory. Things
would have been lots worse, with greater impacts on U.S. domestic policies and greater
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floating is the inferior regime. It is that floating does not satisfactorily solve all the
problems.
One big reason why it does not is that foreign exchange markets are necessarily
adrift without anchors. What we have is an incredibly efficient set of financial mar-
kets in which various obligations, mostly short-term, expressed in various curren-
cies are traded. I mean the word “efficient” only in a mechanical sense: transactions
costs are low, communications are speedy, prices are instantaneously kept in line all
over the world, credit enables participants to take large long or short positions at
will or whim. Whether the market is “efficient” in the deeper economic-informa-
tional sense is very dubious. In these markets, as in other markets for financial
instruments, speculation on future prices is the dominating preoccupation of the
participants. In the ideal world of rational expectations, the anthropomorphic per-
sonified “market” would base its expectations on informed estimates of equilibrium
exchange rates. Speculation would be the engine that moves actual rates to the equi-
librium set. In fact no one has any good basis for estimating the equilibrium dollar-
mark parity for 1980 or 1985, to which current rates might be related. That parity
depends on a host of incalculables—not just the future paths of the two economies
and of the rest of the world, but the future portfolio preferences of the world’s wealth-
owners, including Arabs and Iranians as well as Americans and Germans. Reason-
able economists and traders, not to mention unreasonable members of both species,
can and do have diverse views. In the absence of any consensus on fundamentals,
the markets are dominated—like those for gold, rare paintings, and—yes, often eq-
uities—by traders in the game of guessing what other traders are going to think.
As a technical matter, we know that a rational expectations equilibrium in mar-
kets of this kind is a saddle point. That is, there is only a singular path that leads
from disequilibrium to equilibrium. If the markets are not on that path, or if they
don’t jump to it from wherever they are, they can follow any of a number of paths
that lead away from equilibrium—paths along which, nonetheless, expectations are
on average fulfilled. Such deviant paths are innocuous in markets—as for rare coins,
precious metals, baseball cards, Swiss francs—which are sideshows to the real eco-
nomic circus. But they arc far from innocuous in foreign exchange markets whose
prices are of major economic consequence.
This suggests that governments might contribute to exchange market efficiency
by themselves calculating and publicizing estimates of equilibrium exchange rates,
rates expected some years in future. The floating of the Canadian dollar in the 1950s
was probably an empirical episode of considerable intellectual importance in solidi-
fying economists’ acceptance of the theoretical case for flexible rates. Floating rates
had acquired a bad reputation, rightly or wrongly, in the interwar period. The Cana-
dian experiment seemed to show that market speculation was stabilizing; certainly
there were no gyrations greatly disturbing to Canadian-U.S. economic relations or
to the two economies. One reason, among others, appears to have been a general
belief in a long-run equilibrium not far from dollar-dollar parity, an equilibrium that
accorded both with the interconnected structures of the two economies and with the
policy intentions of the Canadian government. Those who extrapolated from the
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conceivable that the various OECD countries could individually project, much less
agree on, much less convince skeptical markets of, a system of equilibrium or target
exchange rates for 1980 or 1985. So I must remain skeptical that the price signals
these unanchored markets give are signals that will guide economies to their true
comparative advantage, capital to its efficient international allocation, and govern-
ments to correct macroeconomic policies.
That is why I think we need to throw some sand in the well-greased wheels.
Perhaps one might have hoped that the volatility of floating rates would do that
automatically; given the limitations of futures markets, uncovered risks might per-
mit wedges between national interest rates and currency diversification might limit
intercurrency movements of funds. In my 1972 excursion into this subject I was
skeptical on this point, and events since have vindicated my skepticism. I said, “In-
creasing exchange risk will help, but I do not think we should expect too much from
it.” Many participants in short term money markets can afford to take a relaxed view
of exchange risk. They can aim for the best interest rate available, taking account of
their mean estimate of gain or loss from currency exchange. Multinational corpora-
tions, for example, can diversify over time. They will be in exchange markets again
and again: there are no currencies they cannot use.
Let me return to my proposed tax, and provide just a few more details. It would
be an internationally agreed uniform tax, administered by each government over its
own jurisdiction. Britain, for example, would be responsible for taxing all inter-cur-
rency transactions in Eurocurrency banks and brokers located in London, even when
sterling was not involved. The tax proceeds could appropriately be paid into the IME
or World Bank. The tax would apply to all purchases of financial instruments de-
nominated in another currency—from currency and coin to equity securities. It would
have to apply, I think, to all payments in one currency for goods, services, and real
assets sold by a resident of another currency area. I don’t intend to add even a small
barrier to trade. But I see offhand no other way to prevent financial transactions
disguised as trade.
Countries could, possibly subject to IMF consent, form currency areas within
which the tax would not apply. Presumably the smaller EEC members and those
LDCs which wished to tie their currency to a key currency would wish to do this. The
purpose is to moderate swings in major exchange rates, not to break links between
closely related economies.
Doubtless there would be difficulties of administration and enforcement. Doubt-
less there would be ingenious patterns of evasion. But since these will not be costless
either, the main purpose of the plan will not be lost. At least the bank facilities which
are so responsible for the current troublesome perfection of these markets would be
taxed, as would the multinational corporations.
I am aware of the distortions and allocational costs that can be attributed to
tariffs, including tariffs on imports of foreign-currency assets. I don’t deny their
existence. I say only that they are small compared to the world macroeconomic costs
of the present system. To those costs, I believe, will be added the burdens of much
more damaging protectionist and autarkic measures designed to protect economies,
at least their politically favored sectors, from the consequences of international fi-
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I do not want to claim too much for my modest proposal. It will, I think, restore
to national economies and governments some fraction of the short-run autonomy
they enjoyed before currency convertibility became so easy. It will not, should not,
permit governments to make domestic policies without reference to external conse-
quences. Consequently, it will not release major governments from the imperative
necessity to coordinate policies more effectively. Together the major governments
and central banks are making fiscal and monetary policy for the world, whether or
not they explicitly recognize the fact. Recently, it is quite clear from the differences
and misunderstandings among the so-called three locomotives, they have not been
concerting their policies very successfully. I would hope that, relieved of the need to
stay in lockstep in order to avoid large exchange rate fluctuations, these govern-
ments might approach the task of policy coordination with a longer-range and more
global view of their responsibilities.